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Abstract: Comparative research on violent conflict in the Basque Country and Ireland has 
yielded a sizable body of published academic work. Less well explored is the relationship 
between conflict transformation and cross-border cooperation in that comparative context. 
This paper provides a comparative examination of Third (non-public, non-profit) sector 
cross-border cooperation contributing to conflict transformation in the Basque 
(France/Spain) and Irish (UK/Ireland) borderscapes. The comparison is based on the premise 
that the European Union (EU) played a different role in both cases. In the Irish case, the EU 
contributed to the institutionalization of a peace process that included cross-border 
cooperation between Third sector organizations among its policy instruments contributing 
to conflict transformation. In the Basque case, the unilateral renunciation of violence by ETA 
(Euskadi eta Askatasuna) in 2010 did not generate the consistent involvement of the EU in 
an institutional peace process. However, some Third sector organizations became secondary 
foreign policy actors using EU instruments for cross-border economic, social and cultural 
cooperation between France and Spain in order to reinforce their cross-border networks, 
which indirectly impacted on conflict transformation.  
 
Keywords: European Union, borderscapes, cross-border cooperation, identity politics, Third 
sector; Ireland, Basque Country, conflict transformation. 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
To what extent can the intensification of formal and informal cross-border cooperation 
(henceforth referred to a CBC) contribute to the process of conflict transformation in 
conflictual borderscapes? This core question will be addressed in the context of the Basque 
and the Irish borderscapes1. Through the borderscape conceptual lens (McCall 2013, p. 199), 
the Basque and the Irish borderscapes are (a) border landscapes displaying cultural and 
political complexity, with a cross-border cultural identity; (b) socially constructed as shared 
territories by contested discourses and meanings, struggles over inclusion and exclusion, 
involving multiple actors: Basque and Irish nationalists advocating for “border transcending” 
dynamics, in contradistinction to state-driven dynamics which tend to be “border 
confirming” (McCall and O’Dowd 2008); (c) important landscapes for cross-border relations, 
that may be favourable for inter-cultural dialogue advancing conflict transformation. Beyond 
these common features, the articulation between conflict transformation and the uses of 
the border is very distinct in both cases. In the Irish borderscape, North-South relations 
involve the two bordering states, as well as secondary foreign policy activities by the local 
authorities and are the key elements of an institutionalized peace process since the end of 
the 1990s. By contrast, the lack of involvement of the French and Spanish states in any 
institutionalized peace process has, to date, disconnected the issues of cross-border 
relations and conflict transformation. These different framings by the states also inform the 
distinct involvement of the EU in conflict transformation enterprises in the two borderscape 
contexts. 
 
As a working hypothesis, we argue that CBC has experienced different processes of 
institutionalization in the Irish and the Basque cases, with very distinct roles played by the 
EU, having different effects on conflict transformation. CBC, in both cases, should not be 
seen as the miracle pill for conflict transformation. Rather the relationship between conflict 
transformation and CBC presents several, sometimes contradictory, aspects. In order to 
seize this pluralism, limiting the analysis to central, regional and local governmental actors 
would be reductive. On the contrary, we propose to observe how Third sector organizations 
as NGAs engage in secondary foreign policy by capturing CBC schemes and the potential 
consequences of this involvement for conflict transformation. By “Third sector”, we mean 
the third ‘non-public, nonprofit’ sector as those organizations (associations, cooperatives or 
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foundations) presenting a formal constitution, a legally private status, the presence of a 
form of self-government, the non-redistribution of profits and the presence of volunteers 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1995).  The uses of CBC schemes by local ‘grassroots’ actors are 
definitely plural and contingent, and cover very distinct results, ranging from their 
contribution to the constitution of effective cross-border network governance2 to 
instrumental and “back-to-back” cooperation, with intermediate configurations.  
 
Here, as in other conflictive border regions (see Wassenberg and Klatt’s introduction), these 
contrasting uses of CBC result from a multiscalar action, associating EU, state and sub-state 
policy-makers. However, we argue that similarities and differences between both cases also 
need to be analysed through the cross-border activism of Third sector actors. We focus on 
CBC experiences led by the Third sector organizations. In Ireland, we will refer essentially to 
the community and voluntary sector. In the Basque case, we will consider the Third ‘non-
public, non-profit’ sector, strictly speaking, as well as the cross-border configuration of 
‘social economy’ oriented organizations (such as workers’ cooperatives) which have a more 
developed economic activity but with limited redistribution of profits. 
 
This empirical focus is justified in both cases. In the Basque case, Third sector organizations 
are located at the intersection between cross-border social movements related, in one way 
or another, to Basque identity and having a long experience of informal CBC, and policy-
makers aiming at the institutionalization of CBC through bilateral or EU cooperation 
schemes. These Third sector organizations (associations, cooperatives or foundations) are 
involved in cross-border activities in multiple sectors: Basque language and culture, but also 
local and sustainable development, small-scale farming and the social economy. In the Irish 
case, Third sector organizations also have a long experience of working cross-border and 
have had a central role in promoting intercultural dialogue to advance conflict 
transformation. Thus, the aim is to provide evidence-based research on cross-border 
cooperation and the role of the Third sector in a Europeanized form of cross-border network 
governance that would potentially have a conflict transformation effect.    
 
4 
 
Most of the Irish/Basque comparative research to date has been devoted to a comparison 
between militant nationalisms (Irvin 1999), political violence and unconventional political 
participation (Justice 2005), historical approaches to the rise of nationalism (Flynn 2000), 
centre-periphery national conflicts (Letamendia 2001, Keating 2001), and conflict 
transformation processes (Bourne 2003; Alonso 2004; Bew, Frampton and Gurruchaga 2009; 
English 2009; Espiau 2010). This consistent body of literature is focused on the central role 
played by identity politics in the two last violent ethno-nationalist conflicts in Western 
Europe.  While benefitting from this comparative base, the key added value of our research 
is its decentring approach through shifting the focus from governments, political parties and 
militant organizations to Third sector groups involved in cross-border cooperation (Kramsch 
and Hooper 2006). In some instances, Third sector organizations can be pivotal in the 
framing of the “secondary foreign policy” undertaken specifically by non-central 
governments in conflictive borderscapes (see Wassenberg and Klatt’s introduction). Identity 
politics are contextualised here as ‘horizons of meaning’ shared by the actors (Taylor 1992). 
Actors, in this sense, can become aware of their identity when they experience themselves 
as part of a whole, of a cultural framework of values which gives meaning to both individual 
and societal experiences. However, these horizons of meaning inform rather than provide 
the central focus for our research. Our focus remains on the substantive role played by Third 
sector organizations in CBC as conflict transformation. By doing so, we do not eliminate the 
role played by ethnonational, ethnoreligious and/or ethnolinguistic identities. On the 
contrary, we argue that in both cases identity has been and is still a crucial factor in the 
structuring of CBC/non-cooperation; but we do not focus primarily on the political 
institutions and organizations which have built their legitimacy on identity politics. Rather, 
our endeavour is to assess in a qualified manner the degree of influence identity plays in the 
involvement of Third sector organizations in CBC in both regions. This nuanced approach 
allows us to observe, in both cases, the involvement of the Third sector in identity-related 
issues (such as linguistic and cultural ones). But the close analysis of the governance 
networks shows that CBC schemes can also be used by Third sector and political actors 
having very distinct and/or instrumental uses of these schemes. 
 
5 
 
The research builds on continuous fieldwork conducted by the two authors in their 
respective borderscapes over the past two decades. In the Basque case, 33 interviews were 
conducted between 2013 and 2016 with public, private and Third sector organizations, on 
both sides of the border, involved in 26 projects funded by CBC programmes. This paper also 
draws on previous research conducted around language policy (Harguindéguy and Itçaina 
2015) and cross-border social economy (Itçaina and Manterola 2013) in the Basque Country. 
Research on the Irish case draws on evidence gathered from interviews conducted with 25 
Third sector cross-border project providers funded under the EU Interreg programmes (from 
1990) and EU Peace Programmes for Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of the 
Republic of Ireland (from 1995). They are supplemented by focus group material and further 
interviews with Third sector programme managers, civil servants, and relevant EU officials 
conducted between 2006 and 2015. The paper is structured as follows: building upon the 
available literature on conflict transformation and on the role of the EU in these processes, 
the first section examines the relationship between CBC and conflict transformation in the 
Basque and the Irish cases. The second section then focuses on the main results of 
comparative research among cross-border projects led by or involving Third sector 
organizations.   
 
 
1.  Cross-border cooperation, the EU and conflict transformation:  
two contrasting processes of institutionalization 
In the regional realm, a network governance strategy is based on cross-sectoral, multi-level, 
transnational collaborations for tackling socio-economic problems that defy modern state 
approaches3 (Reuter 2007). In the context of a borderscape, it may be argued that network 
governance is a particularly appropriate strategy for dealing with problems arising from 
socio-economic peripherality and ethno-national complexity because it prioritises local 
expertise and attempts to transcend the inhibiting effect of state borders in addressing such 
problems. The Basque and Irish borderscapes may be seen as laboratories for network 
governance in that the European Commission has sought to engage the Third Sector in 
decision-making, implementation and monitoring of its regional programmes Interreg and 
Leader and, additionally and crucially in the Irish case, the EU Peace programmes for 
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Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic of Ireland (commonly known as 
the ‘Peace programmes’) from 1995. In both cases, the progressive institutionalization of 
cross-border relations was strongly supported by the EU and opened a new set of 
opportunities for the increasing participation of Third sector actors, albeit within two very 
different contexts. In Ireland, cross-border relations were given a significant boost by the 
institutional process of conflict transformation emanating from the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement, whereas in the Basque Country EU-sponsored cross-border collaboration 
developed first on a socio-economic, functional and – at first glance - depoliticized basis 
(Bray and Keating 2013, 144). However, these new policy instruments where seized upon by 
the nebula of the Basque social movement in order to enhance the affirmation of a cross-
border ethnonational identity. In both these contexts, Third sector actors played a key role 
in this ongoing process of the institutionalization of cross-border relations.  
 
 
1.1. Two processes of conflict resolution and conflict transformation 
 
On the one hand, conflict resolution refers to a situation where “armed conflicting parties in 
a (voluntary) agreement resolve to live peacefully with - and/or dissolve - their basic 
incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another” (Wallersteen 2012, 
p. 50). In the Irish case, the mid-1990s paramilitary ceasefires and the subsequent British 
demilitarization of the Irish borderscape were important milestones for conflict resolution. 
However, political and cultural incompatibilities continued to undermine resolution. In the 
Basque case, a definitive step towards conflict resolution was made with the announcement 
by ETA4 in 2010 and 2011 of the definitive cease of its armed activities (Whitfield 2014). This 
ceasefire, which resulted from a unilateral decision made by ETA and by the abertzale5 left, 
did not lead to a political agreement with Spanish political authorities, even if discrete 
changes occurred concerning the release of some prisoners and the progressive return of 
refugees and exiled activists to the Basque Country. At this stage, the process of ending 
violence follows tracks (decommissioning, international mediation, prisoners’ and refugees’ 
status) which do not include the cross-border variable as a policy issue. 
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Conflict transformation, on the other hand, goes beyond the mere cessation of violence. It 
offers a more multi-level, multi-sectoral and long-term approach for structural change 
involving international, national and local political and cultural processes. Thus, Cordula 
Reimann states that “conflict transformation refers to outcome, process and structure 
oriented long-term peacebuilding efforts, which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of 
direct cultural and structural violence” (Reimann 2004, p. 10). Michel Foucher also maintains 
that conflict transformation between states and between borderscape communities is a  
process that benefits from at least five components: a national and local political will to end 
conflict and embark on the process of its transformation; intergovernmental cooperation on 
infrastructure projects and building social capital between the hitherto conflictual parties; an 
international dimension to the conflict transformation process with third party international 
actors providing an oversight role; common commemorative projects, including an exchange 
of collective memories on a conflictual past; and sustained local level cross-border 
communication, contact and cooperation (Foucher 2007).  
 
In the Irish borderscape, the cessation of violence provided the impetus for conflict 
transformation involving the institutionalisation of CBC and network governance across the 
island of Ireland. By the institutionalization of CBC, we refer here to the process of 
stabilization and normalization of CBC through the provision of a raft of cross-border 
institutions by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement6. The 1998 Agreement was the result of a 
concerted collective effort aimed at ending a protracted violent conflict that was centred on 
the territorial status of Northern Ireland and involved Irish republicans, Ulster British 
loyalists and UK state security forces. The Agreement proposed a new form of governance 
that had consociational (Northern Ireland power-sharing) and transnational (cross-border, 
North/South and East-West) dimensions. The EU Peace programmes stretched this conflict 
transformation to the local level, involving the Third sector, with €2billion resulting in more 
than 23,000 infrastructural, economic, environmental, educational, training, social, and 
cultural projects since 1995 (Tonge, 2005; Hayward 2007). 
 
The conflict transformation efforts in the Basque country lacked an institution-building 
dimension. Instead, since 2010, they have largely focused on the issue of victims (of all 
violence) and on reconciliation and remembrance. These issues were highly politicized on 
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the Spanish side of the border but also, and increasingly, on the French side. Basque peace 
groups, themselves polarized, have emerged since the mid-1980s. The decrease in political 
violence turned the work of peacebuilding organizations towards a work of memory and 
“living together”. In this long-term process, cross-border relationships are framed by some 
political actors of the conflict (essentially abertzale) as potentially contributing to the agenda 
of conflict transformation (Zabalo and Imaz 2011). The promotion (by abertzale from both 
sides of the border) of new peace forums on the French side provides evidence of this 
enterprise. In both Basque and Irish cases, victims and remembrance continue to be fraught 
and divisive issues that have yet to be effectively addressed by statutory authorities. 
However, Third sector actors have grasped these issues through their projects organized at 
local level. 
 
1.2. The contrasting role of EU cross-border cooperation in conflict transformation 
 
One of the key differences between Basque and Irish processes of conflict transformation is 
the role of the EU and the political framing of conflict transformation by relating it directly or 
indirectly to CBC. In a comparison between the role of EU in the conflict resolution in Cyprus, 
Northern Ireland and the Basque country, Angela K. Bourne (2003) outlined four possible 
scenarios for the potential of the EU. This typology is useful for advancing a comparative 
understanding of the Basque and the Irish borderscape cases. It informs our comparative 
study by referring to different processes of institutionalizing conflict transformation and 
CBC, and by pointing to changes of meaning between the initial framing of the EU policy and 
its phase of implementation.  
 
 
According to Scenario 1 (“stick catalyst” effect), the EU sought to induce change by creating 
new external circumstances, events or processes that change the internal co-ordinates of 
the conflict. The “stick catalyst” constituted an attempt to pressure parties to a conflict to 
change their behaviour. 
 
In the Basque case, this track took the form of new EU measures to combat terrorism during 
the early 2000s.  In Spain, both the governing People’s Party (PP) and opposition Spanish 
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Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) actively pursued the collaboration of EU partners in the 
conduct of their state’s anti-terrorism policy, notably in 2002 by submitting the names of 
radical Basque nationalist groups and persons for inclusion on the EU’s lists of terrorist 
groups, persons and entities. The most controversial addition was that of Batasuna, which 
was outlawed in Spain (in 2003) but not in France. This scenario had two contradictory 
effects: first, the weakening of ETA; second, the intensification of political conflict. This “stick 
catalyst” policy also had a cross-border dimension, as illustrated by the European Arrest 
Warrant that was issued in 2010 against a French Basque member of Batasuna. In the Irish 
case, the ‘stick catalyst’ was much less significant, not least because the paramilitary 
ceasefires predated the introduction of EU counter-terrorism measures. 
 
According to the 2nd scenario (“carrots”), the EU may also “seek to catalyse the resolution of 
conflict within EU member and applicant states by providing incentives encouraging parties 
to a conflict to eschew conflict or pursue compromise” (Bourne 2003, p. 398). In Northern 
Ireland, the EU offered “carrots” to parties to the conflict through the provision of financial 
resources to promote cross-border and cross-community cooperation. Basque politicians 
had sought similar dispensation for the Basque country (Bourne, ibid.) The comparison with 
Northern Ireland was not well received by the Commission, given that “Northern Ireland was 
much more seriously disadvantaged by terrorism and it had a much less developed 
economic base” (Bourne 2003, p. 399). In 2006, the Basque Friendship Group was created in 
the European Parliament to promote the involvement of the EU in the Basque peace 
process, but with little impact given the opposition from French and Spanish governments. 
The abertzale and peace movements (Elkarri-Lokarri) were more successful in 
internationalizing, rather than Europeanizing, the peace process through the monitoring of 
the Basque peace talks since 2010 by ad hoc groups (such as the International Contact 
Group) and transnational peace organizations.  
 
The Irish process constituted a source of inspiration and a strategic resource to externalize 
the Basque cause for Basque parties and social movements, especially but not exclusively 
from the abertzale side (Espiau 2010). However, these efforts did not lead to the 
involvement of EU institutions in conflict transformation. First, the opposition of Spanish and 
French governments to any internationalization of the conflict resolution impeded the 
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involvement of the EU in an Irish-type institutionalized peace process. Second, and in a 
similar way to other minority nationalisms (Elias 2008), the Euro-enthusiasm of Basque 
abertzale and of the Spanish Basque Government, on the issues related to peace and to 
multilevel governance (Borońska-Hryniewiecka 2016), gradually gave way to a form of Euro-
pragmatism in response to the stagnation experienced by the Europe of Regions.  Basque 
Nationalists quickly realized that the EU could be used for contrary strategic aims by the 
Spanish state and other Autonomous Communities, which would shift disputes about the 
Basque tax regime to the European level (Bourne 2008). 
 
The 3rd scenario is most relevant to the focus of this article. The EU may stimulate the 
resolution of conflicts through what Bourne calls “subversion”: “parties to a conflict may be 
encouraged to cooperate with each other or make conciliatory moves as part of their 
compliance with the technical requirements of EU membership or as a consequence of 
functional objectives otherwise unrelated to the politics of conflict” (Bourne 2003: 400). 
 
In the Irish case, cross-border relations were given a significant boost by the institutional 
process of conflict transformation emanating from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, 
whereas in the Basque Country, EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation developed first on a 
socio-economic, functional and depoliticized basis.  
 
The political, institutional and funding environment in the Irish borderscape altered radically 
after 1998. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement provided a new form of devolved 
consociational (power-sharing) government for Northern Ireland, involving Ulster British 
unionists and Irish nationalists, supplemented by the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) 
which is dedicated to cross-border cooperation, collaboration and coordination, and a 
number of North South Implementation Bodies for the implementation of policy on a cross-
border basis7.  By far the most important Implementation Body is the Special EU 
Programmes Body (SEUPB) which was charged with managing EU programmes. The SEUPB 
represents an extra institutional tier at one remove from, but accountable to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and the Irish Dáil (Parliament).  In theory, it is a ‘border transcending’ 
institution that straddles two states and has a remit to manage and promote network 
governance in the Irish borderscape (O’Dowd and McCall 2008). In this regard, it manages 
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Intermediary Funding Bodies, drawn from the Third Sector, which oversee the funding of 
specific cross-border projects. 
 
In the Basque case, in the context of the single market programme’s emphasis on the 
removal of physical borders between member states, France and Spain supported more 
extensive CBC (Bourne 2003, p. 402; Harguindéguy 2007).  CBC became increasingly 
institutionalized during the 1980s but, unlike the Irish case, on an inter-institutional 
partnership aimed at reinforcing socio-economic and, to a lesser extent, cultural cooperation 
between French and Spanish regional and local authorities, with no direct linkage to the 
Basque conflict. In 1983, the French Aquitaine region and the Spanish Basque Autonomous 
Community (BAC) were among the nine border regions which founded the Pyrenean Labour 
Community. Spain's entry to the Common Market saw a proliferation of institutional 
cooperation schemes. Cooperation between the BAC and Aquitaine developed after 1989, a 
period which coincided with the reform of structural funding and the impetus given to 
regional policy by the Single European Act. In the space of just 20 years, internal CBC had 
transformed from a marginal issue for European integration to an important strand of the 
European regional policy (Harguindéguy and Hayward 2012). To the identity-based 
cooperation of Basque movements was added institutional cooperation after Interreg 
funding became available in 1989. 
   
In the Basque borderscape the institutionalization of CBC had ambivalent effects on conflict 
transformation. On the one hand, facilitating CBC represented for the abertzale an 
intermediate step towards the unification of the traditional seven provinces. The Spanish 
government also reinforced its own politicized reading when it opened a legal action against 
the Basque Government concerning its competences in CBC (Bourne 2003, p. 404). 
Incidentally, the development of CBC also contributed to pressuring French authorities to 
institutionalize partly the French Basque country (Letamendia 1997). In the Irish case, the 
effective operation of the cross-border institutions has been stymied by British unionist 
ministers in Northern Ireland who are keen to curtail the development of these institutions 
lest they begin to resemble an embryonic form of All-Ireland governance. 
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This 3rd scenario was probably the most developed but indirect aspect of the EU influence in 
the Basque question. It illustrates the gap between the initial aims of this EU-driven policy 
and changes of meaning, if not of policy, in its implementation phase. Bray and Keating 
(2013, pp. 144-145) shed light on the multiple understandings of the EU CBC policy in the 
Basque case. On the one hand, there was a gap between the initial aims of CBC as promoted 
by a European Commission stressing economic and functional considerations, thus 
downplaying the cultural and political elements, and its implementation by those Basque 
activists aiming at consolidating their pre-existing (Basque) ‘national’ networks. But the 
reverse was also true, given the functional use of EU CBC schemes by local actors who did 
not establish any connection between their CBC project and Basque nation-building.   
 
Bourne foresaw a fourth “post-modernist” scenario: European integration, as a 
manifestation of broader processes of globalization, may transform and ‘moderate’ national 
identities (2003, p. 405). Some observers interpreted the development of a “post-
modernisation” of identities as heralding a post-sovereign era (Bray and Keating 2013, p. 
407). The Ibarretxe plan, as put forward by the then President of the Basque Autonomous 
Community in 2002, consisted of the commitment to a model of co-sovereignty between the 
Basque Country and Spain, freely and voluntarily shared, including a reinforcement of CBC. 
But this post-modernist approach did not help de-emphasize differences and thereby reduce 
the grounds for conflict dynamic. The Ibarretxe plan, on the contrary, was depicted as being 
a very nationalist one by its opponents. Thus, the influence of the EU on a postmodernist or 
‘postnational’ scenario (Filibbi 2007) was not effective in the Basque case. Such 
‘postmodernist thinking’ was also discerned in the Irish peace process of the 1990s, 
particularly in the ‘post-nationalist’ narrative of John Hume, then leader of the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party, though British unionist opponents, such as the Reverend Ian 
Paisley,  detected “Jesuitical trickery” to mask Irish nationalist intent. Nevertheless, it has 
been argued that the infrastructure of governance delivered by the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement contained intimations of postmodernity due to its transnational elements 
(McCall 2001). 
 
According to the ‘Bourne model’, the scenario 2 (‘carrots’) and 3 (‘subversion’) present 
evidence of the EU contribution to distinct forms of institutionalized CBC in both 
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borderscapes. As a result, these new policy frameworks allowed the constitution of new 
cross-border governance networks, which included Third sector organizations. 
 
2. The involvement of Third sector in EU cross-border cooperation and its impact on 
conflict transformation 
 
In the first section, we have contrasted two distinct political framings of EU-sponsored CBC. 
The Irish case evidences an EU-sponsored transformative (and politicized) CBC in the Irish 
borderscape, as constituting one of the key elements of the institutionalized peace process. 
In the Basque case, an EU-sponsored functional (and depoliticized) CBC developed and 
achieved a consistent degree of institutionalization, with no direct connection to a peace 
process. These two contexts generated two distinct circumstances, opportunities and 
constraints for the Third sector.  
 
 
 The development of a cross-border institutional framework in the two borderscapes, as well 
as the role of the Third sector in the design and delivery of EU and other programmes, 
provides the architecture for the establishment of a form of network governance, allowing 
for processes of agenda-setting, devising and implementing public policies which are more 
flexible and transparent (Klijn and Skelcher 2007).   
 
The Third sector may be viewed to be at one remove from territorial government and better 
placed to network with local grassroots organizations. Being part of an hybrid economic 
sector located “between” market economy and public economy, Third sector organizations, 
whether they take the organizational forms of community groups, charities, associations, or 
cooperatives, …, benefit from a social and territorial anchoring that give them specific skills 
in mediation. On the island of Ireland, the ability of SEUPB and the Third sector to nurture a 
form of network governance for the Irish borderscape is not solely a function of continued 
EU support for the Interreg and Peace programmes. It is also a function of Third sector 
organizations’ ability to exploit global, EU and nation-state level opportunities (McCall and 
O’Dowd 2008). Similarly, Basque Third sector organizations exploited all the opportunities to 
enhance CBC. Far from being monopolized by the abertzale, this participation of grassroots 
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organizations was facilitated by the very local nature of many cross-border projects which 
followed the logic “of micro-politics rather than grand visions of nation-building” (Bray and 
Keating 2013, p. 147). In fact, the informal cooperation between Third sector organizations 
had largely anticipated the institutionalization of CBC. With ongoing institutionalization, 
Third sector organizations engaged in EU programmes as well as in cross-border policies 
implemented by regional and local authorities in various sectors: language and culture, but 
also sustainable economy, small-scale farming, tourism, memory and heritage.  
 
2.1. Obstacles and disenchantment: The competing politicized framings of cross-
border cooperation 
 
The process has had to overcome institutional asymmetries and diverging political framings 
of CBC. In the Irish case, whereas the two states, potentially at least, provide strong and 
durable institutional support for intergovernmental or international cooperation, the 
institutional support for cross-border (transnational) network governance is very weak. Only 
a skeletal institutional framework for transnational cross-border cooperation exists 
comprising of the EU Commission, the NSMC, secretariat and Implementation Bodies 
(including the SEUPB), the Third Sector organizations charged with implementation.   
 
The work of North/South transnational network governance institutions - the NSMC, 
secretariat and Implementation Bodies (including the SEUPB) – has felt the restraining hand 
of territorial actors and institutions, notably the Northern Ireland Department of Finance, as 
well as Northern Ireland British unionist ministers who remain anxious about the place of 
Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom and see ‘North-Southery’, to use their pejorative 
term, as something to be curtailed lest it give succour to Irish nationalist ‘United Ireland’ 
aspirations. In this case, if we follow Klijn & Skelcher’ typology (2007), unionist political elites 
have a critical perception of governance networks as being “incompatible”. From this 
perspective, an open participation of different actors (public, private, Third sector…) 
to governance networks is perceived as challenging the legitimacy of representative 
democracy. Accountability ultimately lies with the elected politicians, which renders it 
difficult to overcome inherited divisions. Moreover, the claim that such network governance 
amounts to secondary foreign policy is anathema to this political constituency because its 
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identity is firmly rooted in the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with foreign 
policy being the sole preserve of the UK Government at Westminster. 
 
 With the suspension of the guiding NSMC between 2002 and 2007, due to a political 
disagreement on the disarmament of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the SEUPB faced a 
difficult infancy in balancing management and development, as well as all-island and cross-
border aspects. During this suspension, its pivotal position in a transnational governance 
network, stretching from the local community level to the supranational level - principally 
through managing EU Interreg and Peace Programme funding - was constrained by 
traditional hierarchical territorial governance, particularly in the form of the Northern 
Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel which attempted to keep a tight reign on the 
SEUPB during this period. Though suspension of the institutions was lifted in 2007 British 
unionist politicians serving as ministers in the Northern Ireland devolved administration have 
remained unenthusiastic about supporting CBC in general and cross-border infrastructural 
projects in particular.  
 
In the Basque case, CBC had first to overcome institutional asymmetries: the gap between 
the Aquitaine region and the BAC (which has a budget ten times greater), not to mention 
Navarre, has created an asymmetrical arrangement. The same applies to the difference 
between the extensive fiscal powers of the Basque Provincial Deputations and those of the 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques General Council, and the central role of the representative of the 
French state. These institutional asymmetries problematised the engagement of Third sector 
organizations in CBC.  
 
In contrast, to the south of the border, the BAC was controlled between 1980-2009, and 
after 2012, by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), either alone or in coalition, which, during 
this period, saw CBC as an opportunity to strengthen ties between Basques and to develop a 
secondary foreign policy while disregarding the level of the state (Totoricagüena 2005; 
Bourne 2008;) and to use the European multi-level governance for their own regional 
empowerment (Borońska-Hryniewiecka 2016). The Navarrese government represented a 
third configuration with conservative or socialist majorities (before 2015) which favoured a 
functional approach to cooperation, carefully distancing themselves from Euskadi.  
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Before the mid-1990s, the lack of territorial institutions in the French Basque Country served 
as a brake on the effective development of CBC. This situation changed with the 
establishment of the Development Council, the Council of Elected Representatives for the 
Basque Country, and the Basque Cultural Institute. These institutions were compromises 
between nationalists, civil society and public authorities which were partly intended to 
compensate for the refusal by the State to create a new département (Ahedo 2005). These 
“quasi-governmental institutions” (Klijn and Skelcher 2007) constituted examples of the 
“complementary conjecture” (ibid.), where governance networks become a means of 
enabling greater participation of civil society organizations in the policy process and 
sensitivity in programme implementation. The joint expertise of these new institutions led to 
the signing of territorial development plans by local and regional authorities and the state. 
CBC thus figured among the new priorities. Cross-border policies were promoted by 
heterogeneous coalitions of actors who had instrumental and/or identity-related visions for 
border reconfiguration. Territorial institutionalisation went a step further in January 2017 
when the French Basque Country constituted a unique inter-municipal structure, with 
potentially more leverage in CBC. 
 
This plurality of political visions of CBC was also to be found among Third sector 
organizations engaged in CBC. From a Basque nationalist perspective, CBC was seen as a way 
to strengthen the nation building process, with an opportunistic use of policy instruments. 
From a second standpoint, while acknowledging the side-effect of CBC as reinforcing a 
shared Basque identity, CBC projects were first designed to implement sectoral projects 
organised on a cross-border basis, as in the cross-border association of Basque organic 
farmers (EHKA) established in 20148. A third category of project denied the Basque identity 
of the border region, by considering their projects as resulting from a purely Franco-Spanish 
CBC, as was the case for those projects aimed at social integration through economic activity 
(Itçaina and Manterola 2013). 
 
2.2. Competing identity horizons at work: Third sector organizations and cross-
border cooperation in matters of minority languages, culture and 
remembrance 
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Are these contingent and plural uses of CBC to be found in the sectors which are the most 
‘identity- sensitive’? By way of illustration, the existence of a cross-border cultural identity in 
both cases, signalled by the importance attached to minority languages (principally Gaelic 
and Basque), has historically given impetus to cross-border mobilisation. In the Basque 
borderscape, grassroots mobilisation was aimed at compensating for the shortfall in the 
legal status of language on the French side. In Ireland, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement 
constituted a North/South Language Implementation Body in response to lobbying by 
minority language activists and the cultural identity agendas of Irish nationalist political 
parties in negotiations leading to the 1998 Agreement (Coakley, Ó Caoindealbháin, and 
Wilson, 2006).  
 
However, in Northern Ireland, Gaelic is most closely associated by British unionists with the 
‘Irish republican struggle’ (McCoy 1997; Pritchard 2004). In an effort to counteract the 
development of Gaelic in Northern Ireland, and especially its ability to attract UK 
government funding as a medium for education, unionist cultural entrepreneurs resurrected 
an 18th century Ulster-Scots dialect of the English language (McCall 2002). Institutionally, 
the result has been that the North/South Language Body is composed of 2 bodies: Foras na 
Gaeilge representing the Gaelic language and Tha Boord o Ulster-Scotch representing Ulster-
Scots. Cultural difference in ‘post-conflict’ Northern Ireland is often asserted in terms of the 
Gaelic language versus the Ulster-Scots dialect. As such, these markers of identity provide a 
platform for the extension of conflict by cultural means. British unionist resistance to an Irish 
(Gaelic) Language Act for Northern Ireland is but one pillar of this conflict that can 
destabilise the post-1998 power-sharing dispensation between British unionists and Irish 
nationalists in Northern Ireland, as when the Irish nationalist Northern Ireland Deputy First 
Minister resigned in January 2017, sundering the joint office of First and Deputy First 
Ministers and triggering fresh elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  
 
A similar identification between language activism and minority nationalism can be 
witnessed in the Basque country. Such a perception was reinforced by the cross-border 
internal structure of many of the organizations supporting linguistic and cultural 
mobilisations.  A second cross-border flux was constituted by funding agreements passed 
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between public bodies from the South and associative bodies from the North, due to the 
lack of Basque linguistic policy on the French side. A policy-change occurred in the 1990s and 
-2000s with the emerging institutionalisation, on the French side, of Basque culture first, 
with the foundation of the Basque cultural institute (Institut culturel basque ICB) in 1990, 
and language policy with the Public Office for the Basque Language (Office public de la 
langue basque OPLB) in 2005. Both bodies were conceived as mediators between public 
authorities and civil society organizations, the former remaining an association (ICB) and the 
latter endorsing a public status (OPLB)9. Both engaged in cross-border partnerships 
associating Third sector organizations and public authorities via EU schemes and cross-
border bilateral agreements such as the 2006 agreement between the OPLB and the CAB 
government (Harguindéguy and Itçaina 2015). The bilateral agreements on CBC also had a 
spin-off effect on the implicit public recognition of the Basque language on the French side, 
despite its lack of official status there. In its statutes, the European Grouping of Territorial 
Cooperation (EGTC) Aquitaine-Euskadi recognized French, Spanish and Basque as working 
languages, thus contributing to such a process10.  Incidentally, these new governance 
networks around the issue of Basque language also provided opportunities for language 
activists to become advisors to policy-makers. 
 
This nascent institutionalization of a language policy for euskera in the French Basque 
country did not prevent Third sector organizations from continuing to self-organize on a 
cross-border basis, sometimes by referring to EU policy instruments for social economy. In 
2009, a European Cooperative Society was created between the Northern and Southern 
networks of Basque language immersive schools Ikastolak11. Even if not as conflictive as in 
Ireland, this process of language institutionalization met some resistance, especially on the 
French side. Along with the expected Jacobine reactions, there was also an attempt to 
revitalize the gascon language on the French Basque coastal zone, partly as a response to 
the predominance of Basque language activism. This local “Ulster-Scots like” revitalization 
did not have any significant impact given the very weak sociolinguistic situation of this 
variant of Occitan, but a minimum level of official recognition was achieved, as testified by 
the trilingual (French, Basque, Gascon) road signs in the Bayonne area. 
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In both cases, the consolidation of territorial and CBC policy instruments in favour of 
minority languages had ambivalent effects. On the one hand, these instruments granted 
some institutional recognition to minority languages, thus contributing to defusing the issue 
by satisfying partially the language activists’ claims. On the other hand, this emerging 
process of institutionalization of language was perceived by its opponents as a further 
concession made by policy-makers to one party to the conflict, the one advocating for the 
political and cultural unification of, respectively, Ireland and the Basque Country.  
 
 
Beyond linguistic issues, local historical memory cross-border projects have been important 
repositories of the ethno-national conflict experience (see Harvey et al 2005). These projects 
usually involve the participation of Third Sector organizations. In Ireland, for example, the 
Cross Border Archive Project, funded through Interreg IIIA, was a joint initiative between 
Newry and Mourne Museum in the North and Louth County Archives Service in the South. It 
provides web-based historical information on the development of the Newry & Mourne – 
Louth region that may be of interest to tourists, schools, academic researchers, and the 
general public. Its stated aim is to provide a forum for social inclusion, cross-community 
dialogue, peacebuilding and reconciliation12. Another project, ‘Whatever You Say, Say 
Something’, was provided by the Healing Through Remembering group and involved the 
airing of the experiences of those on both sides of the border, and from Irish nationalist and 
Ulster British communities, who have been directly affected by the conflict. The project’s 
conversation workshops resonated with the ‘bottom-up’ approach to conflict transformation 
advocated by John Paul Lederach (1997)13. 
 
Local historical memory cross-border projects were designed in two very distinct ways in 
both cases. In the Irish borderscape, these projects were designed within the peace process, 
and were funded as such, as a further attempt to overcome ethnonational divisions through 
re-examining the past. In the Basque borderscape, local historical memory cross-border 
projects were underpinned by two different sets of motivations. Local memory projects 
supported by institutional CBC funding aimed at re-building a shared memory on local cross-
border historical topics: memory of pastoralism in Garazi-Aezkoa14 and of the mining 
industry in the valley of Aldudes15, memory of smuggling, etc. Apart from the institutional 
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CBC, the abertzale movement, for its part, developed projects in order to reinforce its own 
nationalist narrative on the history of the border, such as, in 2012, the commemoration of 
the 1512 conquest of the kingdom of Navarre by Castilla. In the Irish borderscape, historical 
memory projects examined versions of Irish histories that revealed erstwhile hidden 
commonality. For example, the pivotal year of 1916 had been read as either the Easter 
Rising (Irish nationalists) or the sacrifice of the 36th Ulster Division at the Battle of the 
Somme (British unionists). Such encounters were important for remembering the Irish 
Volunteers who also fell at the Somme. 
 
2.3. Economic difficulties, political uncertainties, and the sustainability of  cross-
border cooperation 
 
In addition to political difficulties, the 2008 economic crisis impacted upon these processes 
of institutionalization of CBC in both territories, but with a more pronounced impact in the 
Irish borderscape. In the Irish borderscape, EU funding for Third Sector cross-border 
initiatives is diminishing and precarious. Moreover, the post-2008 economic crisis had a 
decimating impact on Irish state finances and any hopes of British-Irish intergovernmental 
support for sustaining transnational cross-border co-operation were dashed. Compounding 
the challenge was a condescending disregard for transnational actors among territorial elites 
(O’Dowd and McCall 2008). When interviewed about issues of cross-border cooperation and 
the operation of the SEUPB in Ireland the then Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs asked 
disdainfully, “the SEUPB? What’s that?”16. However, it is ‘Brexit’ that presents a fundamental 
challenge to CBC in the Irish borderscape. With the UK Government intent on extracting the 
UK from the EU (including the Single Market and Customs Union) in pursuance of a ‘Global 
Britain’17, it was reasonable to conclude that Northern Ireland and the Irish borderscape did 
not feature on its radar. Brexit threatened to turn the Irish border tide from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ 
with deleterious consequences for communication, contact and cooperation across it. 
 
The consequences of the economic crisis were present, but to a lesser extent, in the Basque 
borderscape. However, and even if the Basque autonomous community and Navarra were in 
a relatively better situation than the rest of Spain, budget constraints decided by the 
regional authorities had also some consequences for CBC. Significantly, in 2013, the 
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Navarrese government did not issue the Aquitaine-Navarre 2014 bilateral call for projects, 
prioritizing instead the preservation of jobs in the public sector18. As a result, unlike the 
Aquitaine-Euskadi Euroregion, the Aquitaine-Navarra common fund displayed an 
asymmetrical character, which raised doubts about its sustainability. These doubts were 
partially lifted with the slight improvement of the Spanish economic situation after 2014 and 
the 2015 political change in Navarra.  
 
Conclusions 
  A first set of conclusions addresses the ambivalent role of ethnonational identities. In 
Ireland, Irish nationalist and British unionist ethnonational identities have shifted in large 
part from a conflictual relationship based on antagonism to a working political relationship 
that may be described by agonism or adversarialism (Mouffe 2005). Adversarialism still 
informs attitudes to CBC: nationalists are overwhelmingly in favour, unionists are much 
more wary and circumspect. However, Third Sector ‘unionist’ grassroots groups have 
engaged with many ‘hard’ infrastructural and ‘soft’ capital (conflict transformation) CBC 
projects. In the Basque borderscape as well, identity played the double role of resource and 
constraint for the establishment of cross-border networks of governance. First and despite 
an apparent paradox, initiatives motivated strongly by identity (minority language and 
culture, but also in sustainable farming and social economy), despite being constructed as 
alternatives to action by public authorities, are today effectively spearheading Third sector 
secondary foreign policy activities in cross-border governance networks. In the Basque case, 
the skills of identity activists, who are also experienced Third sector activists, have become a 
source of expertise for building a framework of public action which is now looking for 
projects that offer some structure. On the downside, Basque identity played a negative role 
by hindering the institutional relations between the regional governments of Euskadi and 
Navarra (before 2015), thus leading to separate agreements with their French regional 
counterpart. In other words, secondary foreign policy led by Third sector organizations may 
be encouraged, but also hindered, by central foreign policy carrying distinct approaches of 
identity and cross-border relations.  
 
Secondly, in both territories, EU schemes were used to enhance CBC, but with different 
scopes. In the Irish borderscape, the participation of the Third Sector was seen as a crucial 
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condition for conflict transformation, through cross-community and cross-border 
cooperation. In the Basque borderscape, the institutional framework for cross-border 
relations did not refer to a potential peace process that, since 2010, followed a separate 
political path. Rather, it provided a functional rationale for cross-border initiatives. 
Nevertheless, Third Sector organizations used these new institutional opportunities in order 
to reinforce their previous identity-based cross-border networks.  
 
Finally, the comparative effort undertaken in this paper needs to be extended to further 
sectors where the presence of Third sector organizations in cross-border matters is a 
relevant one. Social services, sports and leisure, workers’ cooperatives, sustainable 
development initiatives, among others, should fall under our examination. Such an empirical 
extension would reinforce our general claim in favour of a new comparative design between 
two Western European borderscapes experiencing both a post-violent conflict situation, 
enduring identity-based territorial politics, a global economic and financial crisis, and a 
challenged perception of European integration as a functional resource for territorial 
development and as a source of legitimacy for minority rights. Focusing on the role played 
by the Third sector in the constitution, consolidation but also the fragility of cross-border 
governance networks provides one glimpse of the state of the European Union ‘from below’.  
 
Endnotes 
 
1. The Basque borderscape comprises of the French Basque region, which is part of the 
department of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques, and the Spanish Basque areas belonging to the 
Basque Autonomous Community and to the Foral Community of Navarra. The Irish 
borderscape comprises of local authority areas, North and South, that are contiguous to the 
border. 
2. Network governance is ‘public policy making and implementation through a web of 
relationships between government, business and civil society actors’ (Klijn and Skelcher 
2007, p. 587). 
3. ‘Cross-sectoral’ includes public, private, trade union and the Third sectors. ‘Multilevel’ 
includes local, regional, national and supranational levels of governance. 
4. Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom. 
5. Basque nationalist. 
6. The institutions provided by the 1998 Agreement include the North South Ministerial Council 
(NSMC) and six North South Implementation Bodies with managerial responsibility for food 
safety (SafeFood), minority languages (Language Body consisting of two agencies, Foras na 
Gaeilge and Tha Boord o Ulster-Scotch), trade and business development (InterTrade 
Ireland), aquaculture (Loughs Agency), waterways (Waterways Ireland), and EU Programmes 
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(SEUPB). Tourism Ireland Ltd is a semi-official body was also established to promote the 
island as a tourist destination. 
7. East-West, British-Irish institutions - the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and the 
British-Irish Council - were also provided by the Good Friday Agreement. 
8. Interview, Biharko Lurraren Elkartea (Association of French Basque organic farmers),  2013. 
9. Interviews, ICB and OPLB, 2016. 
10. Article 14, Statuts du GECT Aquitaine-Euskadi, 12 December 2011. 
11. Interview, Director of Seaska, Bayonne, 2013. 
12. See http://www.louthnewryarchives.ie (accessed 22/04/2016). 
13. http://healingthroughremembering.info/images/uploads/HTR_annual_report_2010.pdf 
(accessed 29/05/2016). 
14. Interview, municipality community of Garazi, 2013. 
15. Interview, municipality of Banca, 2013. 
16. Interview, Dundalk, 22 May 2007. 
17. http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-
full-text.html (accessed 18/01/2017). 
18. Interview, Government of Navarra, 2013. 
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